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A B S T R A C T   
Humans usually favour members of their own group, ethnicity or culture (parochial cooperation), and punish 
out-group wrongdoers more harshly (parochial punishment). The evolution of parochial cooperation is mainly 
explained by intergroup conflict, as restricting cooperation to in-groups can provide a relative advantage during 
conflict. However, explanations for the evolution of parochial punishment are still lacking. It is unclear whether 
conflict can also explain parochial punishment, because conflict is expected to lead to full hostility towards out- 
groups, irrespective of their behaviour. Here, we use an agent-based simulation to explore which conditions 
favour the evolution of parochial third-party punishment. We show that when groups interact and then engage in 
conflict with each other, third-party punishment is not parochial but spiteful, and directed towards all out- 
groups. A parochial bias in punishment decisions evolves (i) without conflict, when groups compete against 
nature and enforcing cooperation requires many punitive actions, and (ii) with conflict, when groups come into 
conflict with a group other than one they previously interacted with. Our findings suggest that intergroup 
conflict does not always lead to parochial punishment, and that stable collaborative relations between groups is a 
key factor promoting third-party parochial punishment. Our findings also provide novel predictions on how 
punishment and intergroup conflict influence in-group bias in human societies.   
1. Introduction 
Humans usually have a tendency to favour members of their own 
group, ethnicity or culture. This kind of in-group bias is usually referred 
to as parochialism (or ethnocentrism, in-group favouritism), and it is 
often associated with cautiousness about, or even hostility towards 
outsiders (Bernhard, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2006 Bernhard, Fischbacher, 
& Fehr, 2006 Brewer, 1999 Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Par-
ochialism has also been well documented in many laboratory experi-
ments, where participants are divided into subgroups based on either 
real life or artificial groupings (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014 Efferson, 
Lalive, & Fehr, 2008 Everett, Faber, & Crockett, 2015 Götte, Huffman, & 
Meier, 2006 Ockenfels & Werner, 2014 Romano, Balliet, Yamagishi, & 
Liu, 2017 Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In these experiments, 
people typically donate more to in-group partners, and entrust them 
with more resources. 
A second important facet of human parochialism is that people also 
use parochial punishment: they invest resources to punish un-
cooperative partners (cheats), and do so more severely if cheats come 
from a different group than their own (Baumgartner, Götte, Gügler, & 
Fehr, 2012 Baumgartner, Schiller, Rieskamp, Gianotti, & Knoch, 2014  
Bernhard, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2006; Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 
2006; Delton & Krasnow, 2017 Guo, Ding, & Wu, 2020 Martin, Young, 
& McAuliffe, 2020 McAuliffe & Dunham, 2016 Mussweiler & Ockenfels, 
2013 Schiller, Baumgartner, & Knoch, 2014 Yudkin, Rothmund, 
Twardawski, Thalla, & Van Bavel, 2016). Parochial punishment de-
velops early in development, as it can be found in children as young as 
six years old (Jordan, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014). It has also been 
observed in experiments with real groupings such as army platoons 
(Götte et al., 2006 Götte, Huffman, Meier, & Sutter, 2012) and students 
associations (Liu et al., 2018), as well as between tribe members in 
Papua New Guinea (Bernhard, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2006; Bernhard, 
Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006). The ubiquitous nature of parochial co-
operation and punishment in humans suggests that these behaviours 
evolved as part of our ancestors' psychology when early humans lived in 
small-scale societies (De Dreu, Balliet, & Halevy, 2014 Delton & 
Krasnow, 2017 Krasnow, Delton, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2013 McAuliffe & 
Dunham, 2016 Yudkin et al., 2016). Hence, explaining their evolution 
is of major importance for fully understanding human behaviour in 
groups, and in turn, for a potential reduction in the impact of inter-
group biases in human societies. 
To explain the evolution of parochialism, researchers have mainly 
focused on hostile intergroup interactions (Böhm, Rusch, & Baron, 2018  
Bowles, 2009 De Dreu et al., 2014, 2010 Masuda & Fu, 2015 McDonald, 
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Navarrete, & van Vugt, 2012 Puurtinen, Heap, & Mappes, 2015 Rusch, 
2014). Intergroup conflict was probably frequent during our evolu-
tionary history (Bowles, 2009 Choi & Bowles, 2007 Lahr et al., 2016). If 
groups compete with each other over territory or resources, then co-
operating only with in-groups and weakening rival out-groups can 
provide a relative advantage during conflict. Many theoretical studies 
have indeed shown how intergroup conflict can promote parochial 
cooperation and its coevolution with between-group aggression (Choi & 
Bowles, 2007 García & van den Bergh, 2011 Konrad & Morath, 2012  
Lehmann, 2011 Lehmann & Feldman, 2008). Punishment is usually not 
present in these studies, but they generally show that conflict between 
groups increases the selection pressure to help in-groups, because 
helpers can increase their own group's survival during war. 
However, explanations for the evolution of parochial punishment 
are still lacking. It is unclear whether intergroup conflict can also ex-
plain parochial punishment, because conflict is expected to favour in-
dividuals who show hostility or aggression whenever they interact with 
out-groups. Hence, conflict is likely to favour spiteful, rather than 
parochial punishment, whereby both out-group cheats and cooperators 
are severely punished, which has been confirmed experimentally (Götte 
et al., 2012). In fact, theoretical studies on the evolution of par-
ochialism typically limit intergroup interactions to hostile relations, 
preventing cooperation with out-groups from evolving (Gao, Wu, Nie, & 
Wang, 2015 Gao, Wu, & Wang, 2015 Konrad & Morath, 2012 Lehmann 
& Feldman, 2008). This is at odds with observations in real human 
societies, where positive interactions can occur between groups 
(Bowles, 2008 Pisor & Surbeck, 2019 Schaub, 2017), and with em-
pirical findings showing that people (i) cooperate with out-groups, al-
though to a lesser extent than with in-groups (Bernhard, Fehr, & 
Fischbacher, 2006; Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Romano et al., 
2017)), (ii) punish out-group cooperators much less frequently than 
out-group cheats (Baumgartner et al., 2012 Bernhard, Fehr, & 
Fischbacher, 2006; Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Guo et al., 
2020 Schiller et al., 2014), and (iii) do not always show intergroup 
hostility (Aaldering, Ten Velden, van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2018 De Dreu 
et al., 2014 Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein, 2012 Koopmans & Rebers, 
2009 Liu et al., 2018). Explaining how this behavioural pattern can 
evolve is necessary for fully understanding the evolution of human 
parochialism. 
We ask which evolutionary mechanism can favour individuals who 
punish out-group cheats more severely than in-group cheats. To answer 
this question, we use an agent-based simulation. In our model, in-
dividuals interact in pairs in a donor game with many partners, which 
can be in- and out-group members. We focus on third-party punishment 
whereby individuals can observe a pair and potentially punish the 
donor, even though they were not directly affected by the donor's de-
cision. Individuals can use third-party punishment with varying se-
verity, and they can also change their behaviour in response to the 
punishment inflicted on either themselves or members of their own 
group. We model punishment as a continuous variable, and we allow 
individuals to condition their decisions based on their partner's group 
affiliation. This allows us to identify conditions under which the se-
verity of punishment is greater for out-groups than in-groups. 
Importantly, we consider punishment to be parochial when it is tar-
geted at in- and out-group cheats, and used to enforce cooperation. In 
contrast, we consider punishment to be spiteful when it is used to 
merely weaken out-groups, regardless of cooperation (Götte et al., 
2012). 
We explore four different scenarios. First, we consider a simple 
scenario in which there is no intergroup conflict, and individuals in-
teract exclusively with in-groups. Here, groups face extinction due to 
environmental catastrophes, and their chance of survival is propor-
tional to their group average payoff. Therefore, cooperation increases 
group survival. On the other hand, punishment decreases survival by 
decreasing group average payoff. However, punishment can also po-
tentially deter future cheating, which could ultimately increase group 
survival. This scenario provides a baseline for when cooperation and 
punishment can evolve in our simulation. Second, we let individuals 
interact with members of another group, which provides scope for be-
tween-group cooperation and punishment. In this case, third-party 
punishers can potentially increase their own group survival by pre-
venting out-groups from cheating with their own group members. This 
scenario enables us to test whether parochial third-party punishment 
can evolve even in the absence of intergroup conflict. 
In the last two scenarios, we introduce physical conflict between 
groups, so that groups with a higher average payoff than their opponent 
are more likely to win and survive. Hence, conflict creates incentives to 
cooperate with in-groups and undermine out-groups. In the third sce-
nario, conflict occurs between groups that previously interacted with 
each other. This allows us to test the previous verbal argument that 
intergroup conflict leads to parochial punishment (Choi & Bowles, 
2007). Finally, we explore a fourth scenario in which groups are more 
likely to come into conflict with a group other than the one they pre-
viously interacted with. This condition allows us to narrow down which 
cases of intergroup cooperation and conflict can potentially lead to the 
evolution of parochial punishment. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Life cycle 
We model a haploid population subdivided into ng = 100 groups, 
each of size n (with ng × n = NT). The life cycle is as follows: (i) adults 
accumulate payoffs during social interactions. (ii) Each group dies with 
some probability (either due to the environment or conflict with an-
other group), depending on the group average payoff. (iii) Surviving 
individuals reproduce sexually, in proportion to their payoff acquired 
during the social interactions, with recombination and mutations. (iv) 
All offspring are randomly distributed into ng groups (no population 
structure, global competition), and start the life cycle again (Fig. S1 in 
the supplementary information). 
2.2. Social interactions 
Individuals interact in pairs, and a random third-party from the 
local group can observe the interaction (Fig. 1a). There are three roles: 
the donor, the recipient and the third-party punisher. The donor can 
decide whether to give a benefit b to the recipient, at personal cost c 
(with b  >  c). After the donor's decision, a random third-party punisher 
who observed the interaction then invests some punishment effort Pi 
(continuous number between 0 and 1) to pay αPi for the donor to lose 
βPi (with punishment technology β:α). Neither the donor, nor the re-
cipient knows in advance the third-party punisher's identity. So, donors 
cannot condition their decision on the third-party punisher's past be-
haviour. Punishers can punish donors for giving and/or refusing to give 
(antisocial and justified/moralistic punishment, respectively). Interac-
tions are repeated over RTot rounds, and in each round three individuals 
in each group are randomly chosen to form a subgroup. We use a large 
number of rounds (RTot = 600) to explore the area of parameter space 
where punishment can potentially promote cooperation. 
We vary whether individuals interact with members of their own 
and/or a neighbour group (always the same neighbour group). The 
term ‘neighbour group’ is only used for presentation purposes, as there 
is no spatial structure in our model. We assume that individuals can 
sometimes ‘move’ to the neighbour group for an interaction either as 
the donor or recipient (Fig. 1b) and then come back to their own group. 
So, third-parties are always from the local group. Therefore, only three 
types of subgroup can occur, and we denote the subgroup combinations 
according to the punisher's point of view (Fig. 1b): (i) the punisher is 
from the same group as that of both the donor and recipient (IneIn); (ii) 
the punisher is from the same group as that of the donor, whilst the 
recipient is an out-group (In-Out); and (iii) the punisher is from the 
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same group as that of the recipient, whilst the donor is an out-group 
(OuteIn). For simplicity, we did not include Out-Out subgroups in our 
simulation to reduce the already high number of traits individuals can 
carry. In this Out-Out situation, we expect full punishment of both out- 
group cheats and cooperators when groups engage in conflict with the 
neighbour group. If groups engage in conflict with a random group, we 
expect no selection (drift) for the punishment of out-group cheats, but 
parochial punishment might emerge as a result of selection for low 
punishment of in-group cheats, such as when in-group cooperation is 
difficult to enforce. 
The number of rounds of each subgroup combination is given by RIn- 
In, RIn-Out and ROut-In (with RIn-In + RIn-Out + ROut-In = RTot). In order to 
avoid negative payoffs, we add a baseline payoff c + β to all three 
individuals in each subgroup (i.e., donor, recipient and punisher). 
Therefore, on average individuals have a baseline payoff f = 3RTot 
(c + β)/n. This baseline payoff f is achieved, for example, when all 
group members are cheats who never punish. 
2.3. Strategies 
Individuals carry five social traits for each subgroup composition: 
(1) one binary trait codes for an individual's default cooperative be-
haviour when in the donor role (either C or D). This default behaviour 
will be expressed until the individual changes her behaviour after 
punishment (see below). (2–3) Two punishment traits code for an in-
dividual's effort invested into punishing donors who cooperate and 
cheat, respectively. These two punishment traits can vary on a con-
tinuous scale between 0 and 1 (inclusive). (4–5) Finally, two traits code 
for an individual's response to the punishment of cooperation and 
cheating, respectively. These two traits can vary continuously between 
0 and 1 (inclusive). 
The two traits coding for the response to punishment each represent 
an internal threshold which works as follows. If an individual's current 
behaviour when in the donor role is to cooperate (cheat), she will 
switch to cheating (cooperation) in all subsequent rounds as soon as a 
member of her own group (including herself) is punished after co-
operating (cheating) by a punishment effort greater than her internal 
threshold. In other words, individuals will switch to the opposite be-
haviour after observing their current behaviour being punished suffi-
ciently harshly. For example, consider an individual whose default (i.e., 
initial) behaviour is to cheat, and whose internal thresholds for justified 
and antisocial punishment are 0.3 and 0.8, respectively. This individual 
will cheat when in the donor role, but she will start to cooperate as soon 
as a cheat in her group (including herself) is punished with an ef-
fort > 0.3 (now, her current behaviour will be to cooperate). She will 
cooperate in the following rounds, but she will start cheating again as 
soon as a cooperator in her group (or herself) is punished with an ef-
fort > 0.8, and so on. 
Individuals cannot switch their behaviour as a donor if they are 
themselves inflicting punishment. Because we assume that donors cannot 
know in advance the observing third-party's identity, we do not model a 
psychology in which individuals remember who punished or not. In 
contrast, we let donors the possibility to evolve a psychology that takes 
into account whether a particular decision (either C or D) was punished 
in their group. This reflects a situation in which individuals can learn via 
either direct observation or communication/gossip which behaviour has 
been punished to infer their own future probability of being punished. 
This assumption seems plausible because people often use what happens 
to others to infer what will happen to them (Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, 
& Tooby, 2016). Furthermore, people tend to perceive members from a 
different group as similar to each other (out-group homogeneity effect; 
(Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992)), which is line with our assumption that 
individuals extrapolate the punishment behaviour of a single out-group 
to any out-group. However, this type of psychology can be conducive to 
cooperation (as punishing one cheat can potentially convert all other 
cheats in the group at the same time). Therefore, we later check the 
robustness of our results to this particular assumption, by assuming that 
only the punished agent can change her behaviour. 
We assume that donors know their receiver's group affiliation, and 
whether they are interacting at their own group location or that of the 
Recipient
Third-party
Punisher
-αPi
-βPi
-c +b
subgroup
Donor
focal group
In-In
Out-In
In-Out
neighbour group
In-In
Out-In
In-Out
a
b
Fig. 1. Social interactions. 
a, In each round, three randomly selected individuals form a subgroup and in-
teract with each other. The donor can decide whether to pay a cost c for the 
recipient to receive a benefit b. The punisher observes this interaction and invests 
an effort Pi to punish the donor (for cooperating and/or defecting) and pays a cost 
αPi. The donor pays a punishment fine βPi (the punishment technology is thus 
β:α). b, Individuals from a focal group can interact with members of their own 
and a neighbour group (always the same neighbour group). We consider three 
types of subgroups: (i) the donor and recipient are both from the same group as 
the punisher (IneIn), (ii) only the donor is from the same group as the punisher 
(In-Out), and (iii) only the recipient is from the same group as the punisher 
(OuteIn). 
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neighbour group (Fig. 1b). We also assume that punishers know the 
group affiliation of both the donor and receiver. Therefore, donors and 
punishers can condition their behaviour based on group membership. 
As a consequence, individuals carry the five social traits presented 
above, for each subgroup combination, resulting in a total of 15 traits. 
These traits can evolve independently due to recombination during 
reproduction and independent mutations. 
2.4. Group survival 
After the social interactions, groups die with some probability, in 
which case all individuals in the group die. Group survival depends on 
the group average payoff acquired during social interactions. Therefore, 
a focal individual can increase its own group's survival, and in turn, its 
own survival, by cooperating (for an interpretation based on ‘multi-
level’ or ‘group selection’ see e.g., (Okasha, 2007; Wilson & Sober, 
1994)). On the other hand, punishment decreases group average payoff, 
and hence, decreases group survival, unless punishment induces group 
members to cooperate in future interactions. 
We vary whether there is intergroup conflict. In the absence of 
conflict, a focal group g survives environmental catastrophes with 
probability sNC( g) = 1/{1 + exp[−h( g − f)/(πmax − f)]}, where 
=g n i
n
i g
1
, is the average payoff in group g, and πmax = f + RTot 
(b − c)/n is the maximum average payoff that a given group can 
achieve (full cooperation, no punishment). The parameter h determines 
the shape of the survival curve, with a fixed 0.5 chance of survival when 
the group's average payoff equals f (Fig. S2a in the supplementary in-
formation). The average payoff f is achieved, for example, when all 
group members are cheats who never punish. This group survival 
function ensures that the increase in survival as a function of the group 
average cooperation rate in the absence of punishment will be similar 
for any benefit b. This allows us to compare simulation runs with dif-
ferent benefits b. Yet, b will still matter for between-individual payoff 
differences. To avoid a population crash, if all groups die in a genera-
tion, two groups are randomly selected to survive (in proportion to their 
average payoff). 
In the presence of intergroup conflict, each group comes into phy-
sical conflict with another one, and only the winning group in each pair 
survives. We vary whether the opponent group is the ‘neighbour’ group 
with which a focal group previously interacted socially, or another 
randomly selected group. The probability that group g wins a conflict 
against group k is proportional to the difference in average payoff be-
tween the two groups, and is given by sC( ,g k) = 1/[1 + exp 
( k g)] (Fig. S2b in the supplementary information). 
2.5. Reproduction 
Individuals in the surviving groups reproduce sexually. They pro-
duce a total of 2NT haploid gametes in proportion to their individual 
payoff. We add 0.001 to the payoff of all surviving individuals to ensure 
strictly positive payoffs. Recombination occurs as follows. All gametes 
are randomly paired, and fuse to form NT juveniles. During fusion, each 
trait is transmitted from one of the two parents at random. Each trait 
mutates independently from the others with probability μ = 0.01. If a 
mutation occurs in a continuous trait, a normally distributed error with 
mean 0 and standard deviation 0.1 is added to the current trait value. A 
mutation in the trait coding for the default cooperative behaviour 
switches the trait value from C to D or from D to C. 
We start all our simulations with a population of cheats that never 
punish and never react to punishment. Table S1 in the supplementary 
information shows all the model parameters. Each simulation run lasted 
106 generations. For each simulation run, we recorded the trait 
averages every 10 generations, and computed the long-term trait 
averages across the last 500′000 generations. 
2.6. Data and code availability 
The simulation was coded in MATLAB R2017b. The code and all the 
simulated data used in this paper are publicly available from the OSF 
data repository (DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/4XG5S). 
3. Results 
3.1. Within-group interactions and no conflict 
We first consider a simple scenario where interactions take place 
only within groups, and where there is neither punishment nor inter-
group conflict (i.e., no aggression). This allows us to determine the level 
of default cooperation that evolves in the absence of other forces. A 
single mutant who cooperates unconditionally when in the donor role 
can invade a population of cheats if the increase in group survival due 
to cooperating with others can sufficiently outweigh the cooperation 
cost (Equ. S7 in the supplementary information). However, cooperation 
does not go to fixation, as cooperators and cheats coexist under a large 
area of parameter space (Fig. S3a). 
We next allow within-group third-party punishment to evolve. In 
this case, punishment allows cooperation to invade completely, pro-
vided the punishment ratio is large enough (Fig. S3b). Because co-
operation is common and mutant cheats are rare, the effort in punishing 
cheats evolves mainly through drift, with a long-term average effort 
around 0.5 (Fig. S4e; Fig. S5). On the other hand, there is strong se-
lection against antisocial punishment (Fig. S4d; Fig. S5), because en-
forcing cooperators to switch to defection decreases group survival. 
Accordingly, there is a high switching threshold for antisocial punish-
ment, such that cooperators continue cooperating even if strongly 
punished (Fig. S4b). 
Here, third-party punishers gain direct fitness benefits from indu-
cing cheats to cooperate in future interactions. This increased co-
operation in turn increases group survival against catastrophes. 
Therefore, the present result provides an additional example of how 
third-party punishment could have evolved in humans for self-serving 
purposes (Delton & Krasnow, 2017 Jordan & Rand, 2017 Krasnow et al., 
2016, 2013 Roos, Gelfand, Nau, & Carr, 2013). 
3.2. Between-group interactions and no conflict 
We now let individuals of a given group interact with members of a 
neighbour group (always the same neighbour group). We find no 
parochial punishment in this case, as there is no difference in the effort 
invested in the punishment of in- and out-group cheats (Fig. 2b; Fig. 
S6). We also find that within-group cooperation now coevolves with 
between-group cooperation, but only when the donor is an out-group 
(OuteIn; Fig. S7a-c). Because there is full cooperation in the IneIn and 
Out-In subgroups, efforts in punishing cheats in both subgroups vary 
through drift, although they remain slightly higher than 0.5 (Fig. 2b 
and b; Fig. S6). These results therefore suggest that, with the particular 
psychology we assumed here, parochial third-party punishment does 
not evolve in peaceful times, and that conflict between groups might 
still be key in explaining its evolution. 
The fact that we find no cooperation in In-Out subgroups, where only 
the recipient is an out-group, is not surprising (Fig. S7b). In our model, 
punishing an in-group for not giving to an out-group is actually detri-
mental to the punisher's group survival. In turn, cooperation with out- 
group recipients is not enforced. However, in Out-In subgroups co-
operation is enforced only under sufficiently large punishment ratios 
(Fig. S7c). Additional simulations show that between-group cooperation 
in Out-In subgroups remains below 0.4 if punishment is not allowed to 
evolve (Fig. S8c). Hence, third-party punishment of out-group members 
paves the way for between-group cooperation in this scenario. 
Furthermore, we find that decreasing the proportion of between-group 
interactions leads to a between-group cooperation break down (Fig. S9). 
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3.3. Intergroup conflict 
We now assume that pairs of neighbouring (interacting) groups 
engage in conflict (physical aggression) after the social interactions, 
and that only individuals of the winning group survive. We find spi-
teful, rather than parochial punishment in this case. Even though in-
dividuals punish out-group cheats more harshly than they do in-groups 
(Fig. 2b; Fig. S6), out-group cooperators are also often punished, and 
there is no between-group cooperation (Fig. 2c; Fig. S7e and f). Hence, 
this type of punishment is used to harm all out-groups, rather than to 
enforce cooperation specifically. Furthermore, the switching threshold 
for justified punishment is maximal (Fig. S10), such that out-group 
cheats never switch to cooperation after being punished. The punish-
ment of in-group cheats is even counter-selected when the benefits of 
cooperation are small and the punishment ratio is large (Fig. S6), 
suggesting that, with conflict, punishing rare in-group cheats is detri-
mental to group survival. As the punishment of in-group cooperators is 
also detrimental to group survival in the presence of conflict, there is 
also strong selection against it (Fig. 2c). 
The average effort in punishing out-group cooperators remains high 
in this scenario when the cooperation benefit is small and the 
punishment ratio is high (Fig. S11, top right panels). So, there is still 
selection for punishing mutant out-group cooperators in this area of 
parameters space. We find similar results when decreasing the pro-
portion of between-group interactions (Fig. S12), which means there is 
selection for punishing all out-group members even when between- 
group interactions are rare. These findings suggest that intergroup 
conflict promotes all-out hostility towards out-groups. This is in line 
with previous models, which found that within-group cooperation 
coevolves with between-group aggression (Choi & Bowles, 2007 Gao, 
Wu, Nie, & Wang, 2015; Gao, Wu, & Wang, 2015 Lehmann & Feldman, 
2008). However, these models did not include parochial punishment, 
and thus could not explain its emergence. 
We also examined the level of default cooperation that evolves in 
this scenario when punishment is prevented from evolving. We find that 
within-group cooperation fully invades even if punishment is not al-
lowed to evolve (Fig. S8d-f). So, physical conflict between groups is 
sufficient to promote within-group cooperation. However, the mere 
presence of conflict with another group does not provide a satisfying 
explanation for parochial punishment. There must be some other factor 
favouring between-group cooperation, whilst mitigating the punish-
ment of in-group cheats. 
3.4. Collaborating and conflicting groups 
We now examine what happens when conflict occurs with a random 
group, and hence, not necessarily with the neighbour group. We find 
that parochial third-party punishment evolves in this scenario. This is 
shown by three different results. First, individuals punish out-group 
cheats more harshly than they do in-groups (Fig. 2b; Fig. S6). Second, 
between-group cooperation evolves fully, even in the presence of in-
tergroup conflict (Fig. S7i). Third, the punishment of out-group co-
operators is strongly selected against (Fig. 2c; Fig. S11), unlike in the 
previous scenario where conflict occurred between interacting groups 
(Fig. S11). 
The type of punishment that evolves here is parochial, as opposed to 
spiteful, as it is not used for aggression towards all out-groups. Instead, 
it is used to discipline out-group cheats. The punishment of rare out- 
group cheats remains high because it ensures that all potential cheats 
can be turned into cooperators, which is beneficial for a focal group's 
success against other groups. Furthermore, we find that under high 
punishment efficiencies, the effort invested in punishing in-group 
cheats is lower than that in the absence of conflict (Fig. S6). We find 
similar results when the proportion of between-group interactions is 
low (Fig. S13). This demonstrates that during conflict, the punishment 
of in-group cheats is moderate, because it would otherwise undermine 
group success. 
3.5. Robustness 
In the previous sections, we investigated situations in which conflict 
was either present or absent. Here, we check the robustness of our re-
sults by investigating situations in which each pair of groups comes into 
conflict with some probability. If a given pair of groups does not engage 
in conflict, both groups face extinction against the environment as in 
our first scenario. As before, we find that parochial punishment only 
evolves when conflict occurs with a random group. However, we find 
that parochial punishment becomes stronger as the probability of 
conflict increases (Fig. 3b; Fig. S14). Fig. 3 also shows that increasing 
the probability of conflict lowers the severity of the punishment of in- 
group cheats, suggesting that natural selection favours punishers who 
are more tolerant with their group members in times of conflict. Alto-
gether, these results demonstrate that conflict creates selection pressure 
to punish out-group cheats severely in our simulation. 
So far, we have assumed that not only the victims of punishment 
could adjust their behaviour after being punished, but also everyone 
else in the group. This particular psychology is conducive to 
Fig. 2. Between-group collaboration is key for the evolution of parochial 
punishment. 
Long-term range of the frequency of cooperation (a), effort in punishing cheats 
(b) and cooperators (c) for each subgroup composition in each ecological sce-
nario. Data shown are from a parameter combination representative of most of 
the parameter range (see Fig. S6). In all panels, boxplots show the interquartile 
range and median over the last 500,000 generations of a simulation run. 
Parameters: n = 20, ng = 100, h = 4, RIn-In = 200, ROut-In = 200, RIn-Out = 200, 
c = 1, b = 3, α = 2, β = 6, μ = 0.01. 
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cooperation and punishment, because a single act of severe punishment 
in a group can induce everyone to cooperate in all subsequent inter-
actions. Therefore, to test whether our results rely on this assumption, 
we ran additional simulations in which the response to punishment is 
restricted to the punished individual only, like in previous models 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1992 Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2015). 
As before, we find that conflict with the neighbour group leads to spi-
teful punishment, and conflict with a random group leads to parochial 
punishment (Fig. 4; Fig. S15). However, we find that parochial pun-
ishment can also evolve in the absence of intergroup conflict (when 
groups compete against nature) if the cooperation benefit is low (Fig. 4; 
Fig. S15). 
The reason why parochial punishment evolves in this case is that 
cooperation is harder to enforce, as each punishment can convert only 
one cheat at a time (as opposed to all cheats at once). Many in- and out- 
group cheats need to be disciplined. Punishing in-group cheats is more 
costly to the punisher's group success (α + β) than punishing out- 
groups (only α). These increased costs from disciplining in-group cheats 
select for less severe in-group punishment. Accordingly, when co-
operation is easier to evolve under high benefits (b), full within-group 
cooperation evolves, mutant cheats are much rarer, which relaxes the 
selection pressure for low in-group punishment (Fig. S15). These find-
ings suggest that when cooperation is difficult to enforce and that many 
punishment acts need to be done, there is selection for mild in-group 
punishment, leading to a group bias in punishment decisions. 
Furthermore, these results demonstrate that parochial punishment can 
evolve even in the absence of intergroup conflict. 
4. Discussion 
We asked which ecological conditions are likely to favour the evo-
lution of parochial third-party punishment−the tendency to punish 
out-group cheats more severely than in-groups. Previous studies 
suggested that a parochial bias such as parochial cooperation, evolved 
because social groups engaged in physical conflict with each other. We 
found that (i) in the absence of intergroup conflict, cooperation took 
place both within- and between-groups, and parochial third-party 
punishment could evolve when cooperation was difficult to enforce and 
required many punitive acts, (ii) if conflict was present and occurred 
between groups that previously interacted with each other, within- 
group interactions were highly cooperative, but between-group inter-
actions were spiteful (i.e., no cooperation and full punishment of both 
cheats and cooperators), suggesting that conflict with an interacting 
group is not sufficient for a parochial bias in punishment decisions to 
evolve, (iii) if groups could develop collaborative relationships with 
each other (i.e., high number of between-group interactions), and were 
more likely to come into conflict with a group other than the one they 
previously interacted with, then parochial punishment could evolve, 
between-group cooperation was high, and out-group cooperators were 
not punished. This behavioural pattern was the most similar to the 
patterns usually observed in laboratory experiments. 
What are the ultimate reasons why a group bias in punishment 
decisions evolved in our simulation? We found that two mutually non- 
exclusive factors could generate this bias. A first factor was selection for 
Fig. 3. Higher chances of conflict lead to stronger parochial punishment. 
Long-term range of the effort in punishing cheats when conflict occurs with the 
neighbour group (a), or a random group (b). Data shown are from a parameter 
combination representative of most of the parameter range (see Fig. S14). In all 
panels, boxplots show the interquartile range and median over the last 500,000 
generations of a simulation run. Parameters: n = 20, ng = 100, h = 4, RIn- 
In = 200, ROut-In = 200, RIn-Out = 200, c = 1, b = 2, α = 2, β = 6, μ = 0.01. 
Fig. 4. Parochial punishment can evolve without conflict. 
Long-term range of the frequency of cooperation (a), effort in punishing cheats 
(b) and cooperators (c) for each subgroup composition in each ecological sce-
nario, when only the punished individuals can adjust their behaviour after 
punishment (instead of the whole group). In all panels, boxplots show the in-
terquartile range and median over the last 500,000 generations of a simulation 
run (see Fig. S15 for a broader range of parameter values). Parameters: n = 20, 
ng = 100, h = 4, RIn-In = 200, ROut-In = 200, RIn-Out = 200, c = 1, b = 2, α = 2, 
β = 6, μ = 0.01. 
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low in-group punishment. This occurred in the absence of conflict, 
when cooperation was difficult to enforce (when we assumed a psy-
chology in which only the punished agent could react to punishment, as 
opposed to everyone in the group), so that punishing in-groups greatly 
undermined group success. Therefore, we predict that people will lower 
their punishment severity towards in-groups when many cheats need to 
be punished and group success is at stake. Selection for low in-group 
punishment also occurred in our simulation when groups engaged in 
physical conflict with a random group and the punishment ratio was 
high, so that the punishment of each rare in-group cheat could make a 
group lose conflict. Accordingly, we observed a decrease in the pun-
ishment severity towards in-group cheats when the probability of 
conflict increased. A recent experiment actually showed that people 
punished out-group cheats more harshly after groups either cooperated 
or competed with each other, and that competition increased this bias 
(Guo et al., 2020). While these results confirm that group competition is 
not a necessary condition for parochial punishment, this study also 
found that competition did not decrease the punishment severity to-
wards in-group cheats. Competition even seemed to increase the 
harshness of in-group punishment in another experimental study 
(Sääksvuori, Mappes, & Puurtinen, 2011). However, a crucial difference 
with our setting is that competition between groups occurred before the 
punishment stage. So punishment had no influence on group success, 
which might explain why in-groups were not less severely punished 
when competition occurred in these studies. 
A second factor that generated a group bias in punishment decisions 
in our simulation was selection for high punishment severity towards 
out-groups. Regardless of the psychology we assumed for our agents, 
selection for high out-group punishment occurred when groups en-
gaged in conflict. This result is in line with empirical studies showing 
that direct competition between groups increased the punishment se-
verity towards out-groups (Götte et al., 2012 Guo et al., 2020). How-
ever, when conflict occurred with a group other than the neighbour 
group in our simulation, a high punishment severity towards rare out- 
group cheats ensured that these cheats would be turned into co-
operators in subsequent interactions. Being severe with out-groups also 
enabled individuals to weaken the neighbour group, in the rare case 
that the neighbour group became an enemy during conflict. These 
predictions remain to be empirically tested. We believe that future re-
search will benefit from investigating different settings in which in-
teractions within- and between-groups are repeated, and groups do not 
necessarily compete with the group they previously interacted with. 
Our results suggest that both collaborative interactions and inter-
group conflict are among the potential factors that could explain the 
evolution of parochial punishment in early humans. Both conditions 
were probably common during our evolutionary history (Lahr et al., 
2016 Pisor & Surbeck, 2019). Thus, our results support the plausibility 
of the hypothesis that selection could have favoured a psychology 
which takes into account group affiliation when making cooperative 
and punitive decisions. Such evolved psychology could explain the 
behaviours observed both in laboratory experiments and in real life 
when people face group settings. However, there are other potential 
mechanisms which could favour the evolution of parochial punishment. 
An example is how different reputation dynamics within- and between- 
groups could potentially lead to an increased severity in the punishment 
of out-group cheats. Such mechanisms have been shown to affect 
parochial cooperation in the absence of punishment (Masuda, 2012  
Matsuo, Jusup, & Iwasa, 2014 Nakai, 2014 Nakamura & Masuda, 2012). 
Hence, combining individual reputations with punishment both within- 
and between-groups could lead to more insight into the evolution 
parochial punishment. 
Our findings also suggest that between-group cooperation could be 
increased in real-life by making the potential to form cooperative re-
lationships with out-group members more visible, and by reducing the 
perception that competition occurs with interacting out-groups. These 
manipulations could help reduce intergroup biases, which often lead to 
negative consequences in human societies. In accordance with these 
predictions, an experimental study showed that out-group bias can be 
reduced when members of different social groups have to collaborate to 
achieve a common goal (Adachi, Hodson, Willoughby, & Zanette, 
2015). Furthermore, we also predict that behaviour towards out-groups 
can be shaped by how in- and out-groups react to it. In our simulation, 
when only the donor was an out-group, cooperation levels were as high 
as when all three players came from the same group. Therefore, instead 
of cooperating less with out-groups in general, we expect people to take 
the third-party's group affiliation into account as well. In line with this 
prediction are the results from an experimental study (Bernhard, 
Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006). In a similar game as in our simulation, they 
found that most donors (dictators in their case) expected maximal 
punishment after cheating (transfers of 0) if the punisher was from the 
same group as that of the recipient. With such expectations, it is likely 
that donors would cooperate fully. 
Finally, three assumptions in our model could be amended in future 
research. First, we assumed that agents could only react to the last 
punishment received, and could not, for example, keep track of the 
average punishment received by either themselves or their group 
members. As we have shown, the type of punishment responsiveness 
modelled is likely to affect whether a parochial bias in punishment 
emerges. Hence, a future research direction would be to investigate 
when parochial punishment evolves under such more sophisticated 
psychologies. Second, we assumed that conflicts occur exogenously 
(defined by a fixed probability), rather than endogenously as the result 
of the individuals' decisions. However, conflicts in nature are likely to 
be triggered when there are tensions or a lack of cooperation between 
interacting groups. A group's tendency to engage in conflict could 
therefore be made contingent on the amount of between-group cheating 
and/or antisocial punishment to better reflect natural conditions. Third, 
we assumed fixed, rather than flexible group membership over an in-
dividual's lifetime. It has been argued that real human groups can often 
be unstable (Palla, Barabási, & Vicsek, 2007 Rand et al., 2009), even in 
small-scale societies (Marlowe, 2005). Two theoretical studies in-
vestigated how parochial cooperation could evolve without conflict 
when groups are ephemeral, but punishment was not included (Fu 
et al., 2012 Gross & De Dreu, 2019). Therefore, a potential extension of 
our model would be to test how dynamic group compositions shape the 
evolution of parochial punishment. 
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